Rubio’s “Golden Age” Pledge Sparks Beijing’s Taiwan Rebuttal
Munich/Tokyo/Taipei/Beijing: The language was carefully scripted, but the implications were unmistakable. When U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu in Munich on February 14, the official readout spoke of strengthening deterrence, countering “non-market economic practices,” and reaffirming an “ironclad commitment” to Japan. It framed the moment as part of a new “Golden Age” in the United States–Japan alliance, echoing the October summit between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Tokyo. Yet in today’s East Asia, such words are not mere diplomatic courtesies. They are signals — read closely in Beijing, weighed carefully in Tokyo, and embedded in a regional order that is steadily hardening.
Within days, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons were responding with layered rebuttals that reached far beyond immediate policy disagreements. Taiwan, constitutional revision, maritime enforcement, wartime memory and the legal architecture of the post-1945 settlement were all invoked. The cumulative effect is not a sudden crisis, but something more structural: a recalibration of China–Japan relations under the pressure of intensifying great-power rivalry.
At the core lies Taiwan. When Prime Minister Takaichi suggested that any crisis in Taiwan could spur Tokyo and Washington to take joint action to rescue their nationals — adding that Japan could not abandon its long-time ally, the United States — Beijing answered with legal precision. On January 27, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun quoted directly from the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, reminding Tokyo that it “recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China” and “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. He further cited “a series of instruments with legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender,” asserting that these impose binding obligations and that Japan is “in no position to interfere in the affairs of China’s Taiwan region.”
Such references are not incidental. For Beijing, Taiwan is both a sovereignty issue and a test of the post-war order. For Tokyo, however, Taiwan is not only an abstract diplomatic principle. The island lies just over 100 kilometres from Japan’s southwestern Ryukyu chain, including Okinawa. Sea lanes vital to Japan’s energy imports and trade pass through waters adjacent to Taiwan. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would directly affect Japanese territory and maritime security. Thus, when Secretary Rubio emphasised in Munich the modernisation of economic and security cooperation and reaffirmed the United States’ “ironclad commitment” to Japan, the message resonated as much in geographic reality as in alliance doctrine.
The Taiwan question is therefore nested within a broader strategic architecture. The Munich readout highlighted the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea in maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This trilateral alignment is historically significant. For decades, tensions between Tokyo and Seoul complicated regional coordination. The growing institutionalization of U.S.–Japan–Republic of Korea security frameworks reduces those frictions and strengthens collective deterrence. From Beijing’s perspective, this evolution narrows strategic space and reinforces perceptions of encirclement.
The economic dimension is equally consequential. The Munich meeting underscored the need to counter “non-market economic practices” and prevent “strategic dependencies.” This language reflects a wider trend of supply chain de-risking, technology controls and industrial policy coordination among advanced economies. Japan has aligned with the United States on semiconductor export controls and economic security measures. While not explicitly framed as anti-China, these policies intersect with Beijing’s technological ambitions. Thus, strategic competition is no longer confined to naval patrols and air defence identification zones; it extends into supply chains, research collaboration and industrial resilience.
Yet security and economics are filtered through domestic politics. During the campaign trail, Prime Minister Takaichi expressed her desire to amend Japan’s Constitution to explicitly recognise the Self-Defence Forces. Asked about this on February 4, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian responded by recalling that “during World War II, Japanese militarism inflicted untold suffering on Asia and the world,” and urged Japan to “deeply reflect on its history of aggression” and “stick to the path of peaceful development.” He noted that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender stipulate Japan’s obligations as a defeated country and that constitutional revision “has thus received constant attention from Japan’s neighbours in Asia and the rest of the world.”
In Tokyo, constitutional debate is framed differently. Japan’s Self-Defence Forces have operated for decades under interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution. Clarifying their status, supporters argue, reflects legal transparency rather than militarist revival. Moreover, Japan’s defence posture has been shaped not only by China but also by North Korea’s missile launches and a deteriorating regional security environment. Nevertheless, timing matters. In a climate of sharpened rhetoric over Taiwan and closer alliance coordination with Washington, Beijing views constitutional revision through the lens of historical precedent.
History itself remains an active diplomatic instrument. When asked about a potential visit by Prime Minister Takaichi to the Yasukuni Shrine, Lin Jian described it as a “spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarists’ war of aggression,” noting that it honours 14 convicted Class-A war criminals. He referenced the 80th anniversary of the Tokyo trials, formally the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, underscoring that memory politics remains intertwined with strategic trust. For China, acknowledgement of wartime responsibility is inseparable from contemporary legitimacy. For Japan, domestic political considerations and divergent historical narratives complicate that equation.
Maritime incidents illustrate how operational friction can overlay ideological tension. Japan’s seizure of a Chinese fishing vessel within its exclusive economic zone prompted Beijing to call for strict observance of the China–Japan Fisheries Agreement and protection of the crew’s “lawful rights and interests.” Such incidents in the East China Sea have long been a feature of bilateral relations, particularly around contested waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In a less charged environment, they might be managed through established channels. In today’s climate, they risk being interpreted as strategic signalling.
The central analytical question is whether the current phase represents cyclical turbulence or structural realignment. Since diplomatic normalisation in 1972, China and Japan have alternated between pragmatic economic engagement and political strain. Economic interdependence deepened even as territorial and historical disputes persisted. What distinguishes the present moment is the embedding of bilateral tensions within an intensifying United States–China rivalry. Japan is not merely negotiating with China as a neighbour; it is operating as a principal pillar of a U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy. Beijing, in turn, interprets alliance strengthening and constitutional debate as interconnected elements of a shifting balance.
Declaratory deterrence further complicates perception. When Secretary Rubio speaks of an “ironclad commitment,” the phrase is standard in alliance diplomacy. Yet in a climate of heightened sensitivity, such assurances reinforce Beijing’s conviction that external forces are emboldening what it calls “Taiwan independence.” Conversely, when Chinese officials assert that Japan is “in no position to interfere” and accuse right-wing forces of “remilitarizing,” Tokyo perceives pressure on its sovereign debate and alliance obligations.
Escalation pathways remain plausible but not inevitable. A high-profile visit to the Yasukuni Shrine would intensify diplomatic strain. A maritime or aerial encounter in contested waters could escalate if mismanaged. A sharper articulation of joint U.S.–Japan contingency planning for Taiwan would invite further rhetorical countermeasures from Beijing. Yet powerful incentives for restraint endure. China remains one of Japan’s largest trading partners. Economic disruption would carry substantial costs for both economies. Moreover, Beijing itself has stated that “true dialogue is built on the basis of respecting each other and honouring the agreements made,” signalling that communication channels remain valued.
The trajectory, therefore, is likely to be defined by sustained strategic competition bounded by economic interdependence and managed deterrence. The post-1972 framework has not collapsed, but it is under strain from forces that did not exist at its inception: a resurgent China, a more security-conscious Japan, and an Indo-Pacific strategy anchored in alliance networks. The interplay of history, law, geography and alliance politics ensures that each statement now carries layered meaning.
What is unfolding is not a sudden rupture but a reordering of expectations. Ambiguity is narrowing. Positions are becoming more declaratory, more legalistic and more anchored in principle. Whether this recalibration stabilises into a predictable equilibrium or drifts toward sharper confrontation will depend on the capacity of Beijing and Tokyo — and their principal ally in Washington — to manage rivalry without allowing symbolism and suspicion to outrun strategic prudence.
– global bihari bureau
