By Dr. Samar Verma*
Thank you, Mr Trump
Much continues to be written and spoken as experts and policy makers scramble to understand the motivations behind and future directions of the destabilising Trump Tariffs. That the world order is undergoing a cold reboot is unanimously agreed. But the reset is not a break from the long arc of motivation that has spurred US action at home and abroad.
For decades, the United States has advanced a vocabulary of open markets and limited government while retaining policy space at home. Donald Trump’s tariff activism does not so much overturn that tradition as make it explicit. Read in this light, his measures provide analytical clarity about a long-standing pattern in U.S. statecraft—and about how India should respond with steady, interest-based, values-aware policy.
A few historical illustrations make the continuity clear. In 2008–09, U.S. authorities deployed extraordinary public resources to stabilise the auto industry: the Treasury invested $49.5 billion in General Motors alone, ultimately exiting at a fiscal loss but with significant real-economy stabilisation effects, and costing US taxpayers $11.2 billion as a result. During the pandemic, Washington again used expansive tools: the Paycheck Protection Program ultimately approved roughly $790–$811 billion in loans with large-scale forgiveness, with upto 77% of that amount flowing to business owners, shareholders, creditors and supplier of firms, and only 23%-25% flowing to those whose jobs were at risk due to Covid. These examples do not indict U.S. choices; they simply underscore that market ideology has coexisted with robust domestic intervention.
Agriculture policy shows the same duality. The WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture allows de minimis support up to 5% of the value of production for developed members and caps U.S. “amber-box” outlays (subsidies for inputs like fertilizers, seeds, and irrigation, as well as price support programs like Minimum Support Price) at $19.1 billion—flexibilities the United States has long used to keep farm support within the letter of multilateral rules, even though they are trade-distorting. Again, the point is not condemnation, but recognition that the world’s leading rule-writer has preserved meaningful policy space for itself.
On trade adjudication, the United States has for years objected to the WTO Appellate Body’s functioning and blocked new appointments, leaving appeals in limbo. In parallel, after WTO panels found the 2018 steel and aluminium duties inconsistent with U.S. obligations, Washington filed appeals “into the void,” preserving its measures while the appellate tier remained paralysed. Whether one agrees with the U.S. critique of the system or not, the practical outcome has been the selective enforceability of rules.
Foreign policy precedents also illustrate the gap between universalist language and particular interests. The 2003 Iraq invasion proceeded without an explicit Security Council mandate; then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later said the action was “not in conformity with the UN Charter…and in that sense… was illegal” The remark has been debated, but it captures how legality and legitimacy can diverge when great-power interests are engaged.
Trump’s current tariff approach sits within this longer arc. New levies on Indian imports—announced as reciprocal or security-related—have been rightly criticised in New Delhi as “unfair” and “unjustified,” with India emphasising that it will protect its national interest. Even analysts sympathetic to Washington’s concerns about global supply chains concede that broad tariffs on partners and rivals alike are a blunt instrument whose effectiveness depends on others’ reactions.
Two recent Indian assessments published in Indian newspapers offer a useful frame. First, former Bharatiya Janata Party general secretary Ram Madhav- reported in The Hindu– points to two drivers behind harsher tariff terms: the systemic China challenge and India’s insistence on strategic autonomy. In this reading, tariff pressure is partly an effort to discipline New Delhi’s independent positioning in an increasingly competitive Asian theatre. Second, Shishir Priyadarshi and Bidisha Bhattacharya of Chintan Research Foundation, an independent think tank, writing in The Print, argue that the United States has misread India- seeing a swing-state ally to be nudged into alignment, rather than a self-assured power that will hedge, push back, and assert when core interests are at stake. Together, these pieces suggest that current frictions are not a rupture of principles but a recalibration of expectations.
It is also worth situating tariffs within a broader policy toolkit. Over the past two decades, U.S. sanctions designations have expanded markedly across programmes (counter-terrorism, human rights, illicit drugs and more), and development finance has been explicitly aligned to national objectives—the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation states plainly that it advances U.S. foreign policy and strengthens national security by mobilising private capital. These are legitimate instruments of statecraft; they are also reminders that all major powers, including the United States, pursue interests with a mix of market and non-market tools.
What, then, follows for India? A measured policy stance can rest on three pillars.
First, strategic autonomy with transparency. The argument for diversified energy, defence and technology partnerships remains strong. Madhav’s framing—China’s rise and India’s autonomy as central variables—counsels prudence in bloc politics and clarity that India’s choices in Asia will be made on Indian assessments of risk and opportunity.
Second, competitiveness over retaliation. India’s best cushion against external tariff shocks is microeconomic strength at home—reliable power, efficient logistics and regulatory stability—so that coercive measures have less traction. The Indian government continues to prioritise this through many national-level missions, which are all steps in the right direction, and perhaps have now acquired a greater sense of urgency. Since, disappointingly, the WTO seems to be institutionally dysfunctional, India can continue to use plurilateral platforms (on standards, supply chains, critical minerals and climate finance) to create guardrails while the WTO’s appellate tier remains stalled.
Third, principled engagement. Even amid disagreements on trade remedies or digital policy, there is ample space to expand cooperation where incentives align: semiconductor ecosystems, maritime domain awareness, resilient supply chains, health security, and green finance. The key is to keep issue-linkages disciplined—cooperate deeply where interests match; manage differences elsewhere without importing them into every file. The precise course of action for each sector and trade agreements will be determined by alignment of mutual interest and trade-offs feasible across sectors, without compromising on non-negotiable interests such as protecting farmers’ interests, a stand forcefully articulated by the Indian Prime Minister. The private sector must play a key role in bolstering the government’s aspirations towards a Viksit Bharat (Developed India) dream.
In this sense, “Thank you, Mr Trump” is less provocation than précis. By dispensing with euphemism, the present U.S. approach reveals a system in which values frequently serve as the vocabulary of interests. Recognising that reality need not produce cynicism; it can produce clarity. For India, the practical response is consistent with a civilisational ethic that prizes restraint with resolve: make choices that enhance national capacity, protect policy space within international rules, and demonstrate—by example rather than assertion—that open, predictable engagement can coexist with strategic autonomy.
The international order has always balanced ideals and interests. What has changed is the degree of candour. If the United States is now more explicit about its priorities, India can be equally clear about its own—confidently, courteously, and with the steadiness that comes from aligning interest with integrity. That is neither anti-American nor naïve; it is a constructive posture for a Vishwaguru role in the emerging complex era.
*Dr. Samar Verma is an economist and public policy professional. Views are personal.
