A QUAD Partner’s Double Game Exposed
Washington’s trumpet-blaring claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan has stirred a diplomatic pot already simmering with tensions, exposing a curious double standard in the US-India partnership. At the US State Department’s press briefing on July 8, 2025 (IST July 9), spokesperson Tammy Bruce doubled down on President Donald Trump’s assertion that the United States single-handedly prevented a full-blown war between the two South Asian nuclear powers, dismissing India’s firm denials as mere “opinions” that don’t hold water. This chest-thumping narrative, however, sits awkwardly with the spirit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), where the US and India, alongside Japan and Australia, recently recommitted to a united front against terrorism. The joint statement from the QUAD Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington on July 1, 2025, condemned the 22 April Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 civilians, and called for justice without explicitly naming Pakistan—a move that now seems prescient given the US’s diplomatic tightrope act. So, what does this transatlantic tug-of-war over credit mean for the US-India partnership, and how does it reveal Washington’s selective lens on counterterrorism?
The US’s insistence on claiming the India-Pakistan ceasefire as its own diplomatic trophy is a masterclass in geopolitical showmanship. Bruce’s quip that “some opinions are wrong” while defending Trump’s role was less a diplomatic finesse and more a verbal sledgehammer aimed at India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who have repeatedly stated that the ceasefire was a bilateral affair, forged through direct military channels between New Delhi and Islamabad. Jaishankar’s blunt remark to NOS—“The US was in the United States”—was a polite way of telling Washington to stay in its lane. Yet, the US, ever the eager global referee, seems to have missed the memo. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s claim that he and Vice President JD Vance engaged in 48-hour talks with both nations’ leaders, culminating in a ceasefire and promises of broader negotiations, paints a picture of American indispensability that India flatly rejects. This clash of narratives isn’t just a diplomatic spat; it’s a crack in the facade of the US-India strategic partnership, especially under the QUAD’s banner.
The QUAD’s joint statement, issued after the 1 July 2025 meeting, was a carefully worded pledge to combat terrorism in all its forms, with a specific nod to the Pahalgam attack. It called for the perpetrators, organisers, and financiers to be brought to justice, aligning with India’s long-standing demand for accountability in cross-border terrorism, particularly from Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The statement, however, stopped short of naming Pakistan, a decision that some Indian commentators decried as a diplomatic snub. This reticence now takes on a new hue: was the US already hedging its bets, preparing to play peacemaker to Pakistan’s applause while leaving India to grit its teeth?
Here’s where the double standards come into play. The US, a vocal QUAD partner in condemning terrorism, seems to have a selective memory when it comes to Pakistan’s role. The QUAD statement reaffirmed a commitment to counterterrorism cooperation, building on frameworks like the 2010 US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative and India’s membership in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Yet, Washington’s eagerness to claim credit for the ceasefire—while ignoring India’s evidence linking Pakistan to the Pahalgam attack—smacks of opportunism. Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus has long been accused of harbouring groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and suspected in Pahalgam. India’s Operation Sindoor, launched on 7 May 2025, targeted nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, a response to the 22 April attack that killed 26, mostly Hindu tourists. The US, however, seems content to gloss over these details, with Bruce deflecting questions about Pakistan’s culpability and redirecting journalists to state.gov for sanitised readouts. This is the same US that, in the QUAD statement, vowed to fight cross-border terrorism, yet now pats itself on the back for brokering peace with a nation it hesitates to call out.
For India, this is a bitter pill. As a QUAD partner, New Delhi has leaned into the Indo-Pacific framework, aligning with the US to counter China’s assertiveness while bolstering regional security. The QUAD’s initiatives, like the Critical Minerals Initiative and the Ports of the Future Partnership in Mumbai, signal a deepening economic and security collaboration. But the US’s insistence on inserting itself into the India-Pakistan equation—despite India’s clear stance that Kashmir and terrorism are bilateral issues—raises questions about Washington’s reliability. India’s suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and punitive trade measures post-Pahalgam underscore its hardline stance against Pakistan’s alleged terror sponsorship. Yet, the US’s narrative risks undermining India’s position, painting New Delhi as a grudging participant in a US-orchestrated peace rather than a sovereign power acting on its terms.
For the US, the stakes are different but no less significant. Trump’s administration, riding high on nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize from both Pakistan and Israel, sees the ceasefire as a feather in its cap, a chance to flex diplomatic muscle in a volatile region. But this comes at the cost of straining ties with India, a key counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific. The QUAD’s focus on a “free and open Indo-Pacific” hinges on India’s strategic heft, from its naval presence in the Indian Ocean to its role in countering Beijing’s “salami-slicing” tactics. By prioritising a narrative that elevates its own role while sidelining India’s, the US risks alienating a partner it can ill afford to lose. The Atlantic Council’s critique of the QUAD’s silence during the India-Pakistan crisis as a “limitation” in addressing regional conflicts only deepens this concern. If the US continues to play both sides—championing counterterrorism with India in QUAD forums while cosying up to Pakistan as a peace broker—it risks eroding trust in New Delhi.
The irony is palpable. The US, which stood shoulder-to-shoulder with India in the QUAD to condemn terrorism, now seems to have one foot in Islamabad’s camp, basking in Pakistan’s gratitude while India seethes. Bruce’s flippant dismissal of India’s denials as “wrong opinions” and her suggestion that the world can see the “clarity of what’s transpiring” on screens big and small only adds salt to the wound. Clarity, it seems, is in the eye of the beholder—especially when the beholder is keen to claim credit for a peace India insists it forged itself. As the QUAD gears up for its next summit in India later this year, the US might want to rethink its script. Partnership requires trust, not grandstanding, and India’s memory is long. Washington’s double game—condemning terrorism in joint statements while playing neutral referee in South Asia’s oldest feud—might just leave it preaching peace to an empty room.
