By Deepak Parvatiyar*
Ongoing Diplomacy: India Engages US, Iran, BRICS Amid Unresolved Questions
New Delhi: India is managing multiple ongoing diplomatic and strategic issues involving the United States, Iran, and multilateral defence exercises, while several key questions remain unresolved.
These developments are proceeding along largely independent tracks. Engagement with the United States has intensified across trade, energy, defence, and regional security discussions. Interaction with Iran remains constrained by U.S. sanctions, particularly in relation to the Chabahar port project. Separately, India has made selective choices in multilateral naval exercises, including its absence from a South Africa–initiated BRICS-related drill in the Indian Ocean. Officials have provided data, clarifications, and updates on each front individually, but no public statement has been issued connecting these activities into a single policy framework.
Regarding Iran and the Chabahar port project, operations continue under a conditional sanctions waiver issued by the U.S. Treasury Department on October 28, 2025, valid through April 26, 2026. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Official Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed during a press briefing on January 16, 2026, that India “remain[s] engaged with the U.S. side in working out this arrangement,” a formulation reiterated across multiple briefings. The government has not specified whether these discussions aim to extend India’s operational role, adjust current activities, or plan for scenarios after the waiver expires. Chabahar continues to operate, providing access to Afghanistan and Central Asia via the International North-South Transport Corridor.
India’s bilateral trade with Iran in the last financial year totalled approximately $1.6 billion, with exports at around $1.2 billion and imports at about $0.4 billion, representing roughly 0.15 percent of India’s total global trade. While economically modest, the relationship carries geopolitical significance, given Iran’s past support on issues such as Kashmir and its involvement in Afghanistan. Security concerns persist following the December 2025 seizure of the tanker MT Valiant Roar by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which carried 16 Indian crew members. India has repeatedly requested consular access for all 16 crew members, first on December 14, 2025, and subsequently through diplomatic channels and meetings. Officials have also engaged with the vessel’s United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based owner to ensure welfare provisions and legal representation. Commercial flights to and from Iran continue to operate, and government representatives have indicated that additional measures will be taken if circumstances require, though no specific triggers for such action have been publicly stated.
Engagement with the United States has proceeded concurrently. On January 13, 2026, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a phone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, this was the first conversation between the two leaders, covering trade, critical minerals, defence, civil nuclear cooperation, and energy. The discussion covered trade negotiations, critical minerals, defence cooperation, civil nuclear collaboration, energy, and regional developments. Trade teams on both sides remain active, seeking to advance a mutually acceptable bilateral agreement, although no timelines, specific convergences, or concessions have been announced. India’s crude oil imports from the U.S. have increased substantially—rising more than 92 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of the current fiscal year (April–November 2025), with a notable 144 percent increase in November alone. These figures have been cited during discussions on tariffs, market access, and energy security. Indian officials maintain routine interactions with members of the U.S. Congress to support continuity in bilateral engagement.
On multilateral exercises, India opted not to participate in a South Africa–initiated naval exercise in January 2026, involving several BRICS members including Russia, China, and Iran. The Ministry of External Affairs clarified that this exercise was “entirely a South African initiative” and not a regular or institutionalised BRICS activity. Officials also noted that India has historically abstained from similar ad-hoc exercises. India’s ongoing maritime engagement in this context remains the India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime (IBSAMAR) series with Brazil and South Africa, the most recent edition of which took place in October 2024. No additional details were provided regarding the rationale for non-participation beyond procedural and historical precedent.
Across all domains, Indian officials have provided figures, dates, and updates on each matter, including trade volumes, energy imports, call readouts, and consular interventions. Issues have been addressed individually, with reference to ongoing dialogue, monitoring, and established practices. Questions regarding potential linkages, policy trade-offs, or an integrated strategic approach have not been answered publicly.
The current picture shows India actively managing multiple diplomatic and strategic engagements simultaneously. Confirmed details illuminate the “what” and “with whom” of these interactions: Chabahar remains operational under the U.S. waiver, trade and energy discussions with Washington are ongoing, and multilateral naval engagement is selective. At the same time, several questions remain unresolved, including timelines for bilateral agreements, conditions for escalation or intervention in Iran, and the rationale for selective participation in ad-hoc multilateral exercises.
*Senior journalist
