Peace Mechanism Tests Resolve of DRC and Rwanda
Washington: As diplomats filed out of the conference rooms in Washington, the message from two days of closed-door talks was unambiguous: the fragile peace architecture connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda has entered a more technical, consequential phase. Representatives of both governments, joined by the United States, Qatar, Togo in its role as African Union mediator, and the African Union Commission, convened the fourth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism to assess how far the Washington Peace Agreement—signed on 27 June 2025—has progressed, and where its most complex hurdles now lie.
The conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda has deep roots in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—composed largely of Hutu fighters who fled into eastern Congo—established entrenched bases in a region marked by weak state control and overlapping ethnic dynamics. For years, Rwanda has cited the FDLR’s presence as a direct threat to its security, while the DRC has repeatedly accused Rwanda and the March 23 Movement (M23) of undermining its territorial integrity. The Washington Peace Agreement of 27 June 2025—brokered by the African Union (AU), the State of Qatar, and the United States Department of State (U.S. DOS)—created the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) to supervise commitments on disarmament, withdrawal measures, humanitarian guarantees, and alignment with the Doha Framework. The fourth JSCM meeting, now underway in Washington, marks a critical step in moving the region from years of entrenched accusations toward structured coordination.
At the heart of this week’s discussions was the Operational Order, known among participants as the OPORD, which is intended to translate the Concept of Operations for the Harmonised Plan into concrete sequencing and field-level actions. That plan calls for the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a long-standing armed group originating from the remnants of the génocidaires who fled Rwanda in 1994, and whose presence in eastern Congo has for decades fuelled mistrust between Kinshasa and Kigali. Alongside this, Rwanda has committed—within the same operational framework—to lift a series of defensive measures once the neutralisation process is demonstrably underway.
Both sides reaffirmed their intention to advance the OPORD. Observers from the Joint Mechanism acknowledged ongoing efforts to facilitate the demobilisation, repatriation, and reintegration of FDLR members, a core provision of all previous regional stabilisation initiatives. Unlike past demobilisation drives, the Washington process is built on synchronised commitments, in which steps taken by one party are intended to unlock reciprocal measures from the other.
Most of the discussions this week were devoted to reviewing progress on Phase One of the OPORD. These included updates on intelligence-sharing channels—historically one of the most politically sensitive aspects of DRC-Rwanda cooperation—and the information operations launched by Congolese authorities to encourage FDLR combatants to surrender in accessible areas. Delegations held what the United States described as “open discussions” to identify remaining gaps, operational challenges and the adjustments needed before the transition to Phase Two, which would encompass more assertive FDLR neutralisation activities and the commencement of Rwanda’s stepwise lifting of defensive measures.
The meeting also placed the Washington security track within the wider ecosystem of political dialogue processes. Participants welcomed the recent signing of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the DRC and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23 Movement—a key armed actor in North Kivu whose resurgence since late 2021 has been central to the deterioration of DRC-Rwanda relations. Qatar, which facilitated the Doha talks, was commended for its “leadership” in securing the framework. All Joint Mechanism members underscored the strategic value of maintaining close linkages between the Doha and Washington tracks, a subtle acknowledgement that the stability of eastern Congo hinges on simultaneous progress across several interoperating agreements.
In a further layer of diplomacy, Togo was thanked for preparing to host the High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region on 17 January 2026. This gathering is expected to place the Washington and Doha agreements within a broader continental context, drawing in African Union structures and regional organisations long involved in Great Lakes mediation efforts. The sequencing of that meeting—less than two months from now—suggests a deliberate push to prevent the current diplomatic momentum from dissipating.
In an unusual line for a multilateral communiqué, the parties also expressed appreciation for the role played by President Donald Trump in facilitating the process. While the statement did not elaborate, Washington has hosted all four Joint Mechanism meetings, and U.S. engagement—under both the Department of State and the National Security Council—has been central to sustaining the interlocking architecture of commitments established since June.
The Joint Mechanism’s work sits against a complex backdrop. The FDLR’s continued presence in eastern Congo has been a source of recurring insecurity for local communities and a persistent trigger of Rwandan intervention pressures. Congo, for its part, has long accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 movement—an allegation Kigali denies—while Rwanda has accused Congo of collaborating, directly or indirectly, with FDLR elements. Previous attempts to dismantle the FDLR, including under the 2013 Nairobi Framework and earlier regional operations, struggled to balance military pressure with pathways for voluntary demobilisation. The Washington process, by explicitly linking FDLR neutralisation to the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, attempts to create a more predictable, mutually reinforcing chain of actions.
The reference to demobilisation, repatriation, and reintegration in this week’s statement reflects long-standing UN-backed structures administered through the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) framework. While hundreds of FDLR members have passed through these channels over the years, periodic fragmentation of the group, the difficult terrain of eastern Congo, and the political sensitivities surrounding forced versus voluntary return have hampered more decisive progress.
Against this history, the Joint Mechanism’s detailed focus on information operations and intelligence-sharing underscores how technical elements—rather than grand declarations—will likely determine whether the Washington Peace Agreement can shift long-standing dynamics on the ground.
This week’s meeting closed with a reaffirmation by all parties of their commitment to sustaining the Washington process and pursuing what they described as “durable peace and stability” in eastern DRC and the wider Great Lakes region. The tone reflected both cautious optimism and a recognition that the most demanding phases of implementation still lie ahead: from translating operational orders into synchronised field actions, to aligning the timelines of the Washington and Doha tracks, to navigating the regional summit diplomacy that will continue into early 2026.
For now, the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism remains the central forum where the technical and political strands of the peace architecture converge. Its fourth meeting in Washington did not announce new breakthroughs, but it did consolidate the structural foundations—OPORD, CONOPS, demobilisation mechanisms, cross-track linkages—on which any lasting reduction in tension between Congo and Rwanda will depend.
– global bihari bureau
