China’s Grey-Zone Pressure Mounts on Taiwan, 2026
Taiwan Faces China’s Persistent Coercion Across Domains
Taipei/Beijing: As the first week of January 2026 unfolded, military activity around Taiwan reinforced a familiar but steadily intensifying reality: the Taiwan Strait is not in an acute crisis, yet it remains under sustained and carefully managed pressure. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, between 6 a.m. on January 2 and 6 a.m. on January 3 (UTC+8), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted air and naval operations in waters and airspace surrounding the island. During this period, four PLA aircraft sorties, six PLA Navy vessels, and one Chinese official ship were detected operating around Taiwan. Of the four aircraft sorties, one crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s central air defence identification zone. In response, the Republic of China Armed Forces (ROC Armed Forces) monitored the situation and deployed combat air patrol aircraft, naval vessels, and coastal missile systems in line with established operating procedures. Separately, one People’s Republic of China balloon was detected during the same timeframe, adding another layer to what Taiwanese officials describe as persistent, low-intensity activity rather than episodic provocation.
In isolation, the January 3 activity was limited in scale. In context, it reflected a now-familiar post-exercise pattern: sustained presence at lower intensity, calibrated to maintain pressure while avoiding escalation. The December 2025 drills, officially framed by Beijing as Justice Mission 2025, marked a notable inflexion point. Air, naval, and missile forces operated in close coordination, with aircraft and vessels venturing nearer to Taiwan than in previous iterations and into zones that had long functioned as informal buffers. The median line of the Taiwan Strait, once tacitly observed even during periods of heightened tension, was treated operationally as less relevant. The exercises included live-fire operations and multi-domain coordination. Taiwan reported that no casualties occurred during the drills.
Taiwan’s strategic posture has remained deliberately measured. Defence authorities emphasised that the January 3 movements were closely monitored and handled through routine deployments, avoiding changes in alert posture that might imply imminent danger. Public messaging stressed vigilance and preparedness while deliberately avoiding alarmist framing. This reflects a broader strategic calculation: maintain stability, limit escalation opportunities for Beijing, and preserve time for the development of asymmetric capabilities.
Taiwan’s measured restraint is further complicated by domestic budgetary challenges. The proposed NT$1.25 trillion (~US$40 billion) special defence package for 2026–2033, formally titled the Special Act on Strengthening Defence Resilience and Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities, has been stalled due to legislative gridlock led by opposition parties, primarily the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). First proposed by President Lai Ching-te in late November 2025, the package aims to raise defence spending above 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and enhance asymmetric capabilities, including advanced missile defence, artificial intelligence-enabled systems, domestic weapons self-reliance, training programs, reserve force modernisation, Coast Guard upgrades, and procurement of drones and precision munitions. Repeated blockage in the Legislative Yuan has delayed both this special package and the broader 2026 budget, creating short-term readiness gaps and potentially signalling vulnerabilities to both allies and Beijing. President Lai has urged cross-party unity, warning that delays could erode confidence in Taiwan’s self-defence resolve.
External support is an important component of Taiwan’s deterrence posture. Verified U.S. arms sales include F-16 fighter jet sustainment programs, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar upgrades, Harpoon anti-ship missile support, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile deliveries, and infrared search-and-track (IRST) pods for F-16 aircraft. Collectively, these initiatives strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities while providing a tangible signal to Beijing. At the same time, China frames these actions as interference, forming part of its justification for broader grey-zone pressure.
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China’s approach exemplifies modern grey-zone operations, deliberately positioned between routine statecraft and open warfare. The strategy seeks to impose cumulative strategic pressure without triggering a conventional military response. Its hallmarks include ambiguity, incrementalism, multi-domain coordination, and avoidance of red lines. Repeated actions—PLA air and naval sorties, post-drill persistence, balloon overflights, militia and Coast Guard deployments, economic measures, and information campaigns—affect readiness, influence international attention, and gradually normalise previously unacceptable actions. By 2026, practices such as crossing the median line or conducting blockade rehearsals, once provocative, have become operationally routine. Taiwan bears asymmetric costs, allocating political capital and resources daily to maintain the status quo, while international partners are constrained by the absence of a single triggering event. China’s grey-zone strategy does not aim for immediate invasion but seeks to make the status quo increasingly challenging for Taiwan and strategically costly for its allies, one incremental step at a time.
In addition to conventional military pressure, transnational repression has been officially documented. On January 3, 2026, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) reported that Chinese state media disseminated satellite imagery of Legislator Puma Shen’s residence and workplace on social media platforms in a malicious attempt to intimidate. MOFA described this as transnational repression, citing violations of international human rights norms and reiterating that Beijing has no jurisdiction over Taiwan nationals. The ministry stated that Taiwan will protect citizens targeted by such activities and impose legal consequences on collaborators. MOFA further emphasised coordination with international partners to safeguard nationals abroad and prevent strategic effects from these measures, illustrating that China’s grey-zone strategy extends beyond conventional military pressure into digital, psychological, and legal domains.
Beijing’s refinement of its grey-zone playbook is evident. Justice Mission 2025’s unprecedented proximity, live-fire operations into sensitive zones, and multi-force blockade rehearsals demonstrate capability and intent, while immediate post-drill persistence—through PLA sorties, naval patrols, and balloon activity—reinforces contested operational norms. These actions nullify the median line, probe contiguous zones, and compound indirect costs, including commercial risk premiums in vital trade lanes. Taiwan’s measured restraint preserves stability and enables asymmetric capability development, yet domestic budget delays expose potential vulnerabilities. External support strengthens deterrence while simultaneously allowing Beijing to frame actions as responses to foreign interference. The principal challenge in 2026 is the cumulative effect of sustained pressure. While no indicators of imminent invasion exist, error margins tighten due to operational and psychological strain. Taiwanese political cohesion and consistent international support are essential to resist incremental erosion; lapses could allow Beijing to shift the balance gradually rather than through sudden escalation. The pressure is increasing subtly but steadily.
The central challenge of 2026 lies in the endurance of pressures across conventional and transnational domains. Sustained domestic cohesion and steady international commitment will be essential to counter the gradual erosion. Any fracture—internal or external—risks shifting the balance decisively in Beijing’s favour, not through sudden shock but through incremental accumulation. For now, the situation remains managed, but the pressure is compounding.
– global bihari bureau
