By Nava Thakuria*
Guwahati/Dhaka: The rapid rise of Islamist political groups in Bangladesh, exploiting the political void left by the August 2024 ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, poses a severe security threat to India’s northeastern states, risking cross-border militancy, demographic pressures, and economic disruptions. Radical factions like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have gained significant ground, while the interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, oversees reform commissions amid delayed elections. Yunus’s recent proposals for an economic plan involving India’s Northeast, made during a China visit, have sparked sharp criticism from Indian leaders, escalating tensions along the 4,096-km shared border and endangering the strategic Siliguri Corridor.
On August 5, 2024, a student-led uprising, dubbed the Monsoon Revolution, forced Hasina to resign and flee to India after 15 years of Awami League rule. Yunus, the 84-year-old economist heading the interim government, described the rebellion as Bangladesh’s “second freedom movement,” raising expectations among the nation’s 170 million citizens for transformative reforms. The administration has prioritised reform commissions to propose changes in governance, economy, and social welfare, engaging political parties to finalise plans. However, nine months later, political uncertainty persists, with the next general election postponed to June 2026, despite demands from some leaders for polls by December 2025. The delay has coincided with a surge in Islamist influence, exacerbating law-and-order challenges.
A major controversy erupted when a commission dedicated to women’s welfare proposed enhanced freedoms and benefits, prompting large-scale protests from Islamist parties. Groups like Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Andolan Bangladesh, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which organised a “March for Khilafat” in Dhaka on March 7, 2025, mobilised thousands, rejecting the reforms as un-Islamic. These parties, gaining traction in the nation bordered by India, Myanmar, and the Bay of Bengal, have benefited from the interim government’s decision to lift restrictions on Jamaat-e-Islami, previously banned under anti-terrorism laws, and its tolerance of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s activities. Indian intelligence agencies report that Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, is radicalising youth, with potential links to Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). A January 2025 ISI visit to Bangladesh’s border areas has raised concerns about anti-India activities, including support for insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).
The interim government’s actions against the Awami League have reshaped the political landscape. On May 10, 2025, authorities banned all Awami League activities under a revised anti-terrorism law, and the Bangladesh Election Commission suspended its registration, barring the party, which led Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation from Pakistan, from the upcoming polls. The purge culminated in the April 2025 escape of former President Mohammad Abdul Hamid to Thailand, as he faced a murder investigation alongside other Awami League leaders. This crackdown has weakened secular forces, creating space for Islamist factions to dominate, a shift that alarms India’s Northeast, where historical insurgencies and demographic sensitivities persist.
The northeastern states—Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram—face heightened risks due to their proximity to Bangladesh. Connected to mainland India by the 22-km Siliguri Corridor, known as the Chicken’s Neck, the region is vulnerable to militancy and illegal immigration. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War saw 10 million refugees flood Assam and Tripura, and subsequent decades altered demographics, sparking the 1980s Assam Movement over cultural and resource concerns. Recent reports reflect Indian fears, alleging Bangladesh’s government is “promoting extremists” and collaborating with China and Pakistan on an airbase near the Siliguri Corridor, though these claims lack official confirmation. The Northeast’s 213 tribal groups and ongoing insurgencies, like the National Liberation Front of Tripura, amplify its fragility.
Yunus’s statements have intensified bilateral strains. During a March 26–29, 2025, visit to China, where he secured USD 1 billion in investments for infrastructure, river data-sharing, and military cooperation, Yunus proposed an “integrated economic plan” involving Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and India’s “Seven Sisters.” He stated that the landlocked Northeast has “no way to reach out” to the ocean without Bangladesh, omitting India’s Kaladan multi-modal project linking Sittwe Port in Myanmar to the region. On April 4, 2025, at the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok, he reiterated the need for cross-border collaboration in hydropower, healthcare, tourism, and connectivity. A Dhaka-based aide clarified that Yunus aimed to create economic opportunities, citing Nepal’s 40 MW power supply and 2,500 Nepali students in Bangladesh. The aide noted that regional production, supported by markets like China, could yield affordable, high-quality goods.
Indian leaders condemned the remarks. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma called them “offensive” and “condemnable,” rejecting vulnerability narratives for the Siliguri Corridor. Tipra Motha chief Pradyut Debbarma emphasised the Northeast’s self-reliance, stating it is “not dependent on anyone for its growth.” Congress MP Gaurav Gogoi and former Manipur CM N. Biren Singh labelled the statements “irresponsible,” criticising Yunus’s China engagement as aligning with India’s rival. India perceives Bangladesh’s growing ties with China, including USD 7 billion in Belt and Road Initiative investments, and warming relations with Pakistan, including defence procurement talks, as threats to its regional influence, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, where India operates the Sittwe Port.
Economic tensions have escalated. On May 17, 2025, India restricted Bangladeshi imports worth USD 770 million, limiting goods like garments to Nhava Sheva and Kolkata seaports, disrupting Bangladesh’s USD 45 billion garment industry. This followed the April 8, 2025, withdrawal of a transhipment facility enabling Bangladeshi exports via Indian ports since 2020. Bangladesh’s April 13, 2025, curbs on Indian yarn imports prompted India’s retaliation, increasing logistics costs by 20–30% and impacting northeastern trade routes. Reports highlight the “triple jeopardy” of high transit charges, Islamist unrest, and trade disruptions threatening northeastern industries.
Border and minority issues persist. On May 15, 2025, Indian forces pushed back 200 alleged Bangladeshi nationals, prompting Dhaka’s protests over informal repatriation. The April 2025 arrest of 66 Indian nationals for illegal crossing and Sylhet border scuffles underscore ongoing challenges. Between October 1–12, 2024, 35 attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, including temple vandalism during Durga Puja, and the arrest of ISKCON priest Chinmoy Das raised India’s concerns, discussed at the February 2025 BSF-BGB conference. Bangladesh’s Border Guards dismissed reports as “media exaggeration,” proposing joint media monitoring. The unresolved Teesta water-sharing agreement, dormant since 2010, and China’s interest in a Teesta project fuel further tensions.
India-Bangladesh ties, robust under Hasina, have deteriorated since 2024, with anti-India sentiment growing over perceived meddling and border killings. The Northeast’s role in India’s Act East policy and its underdevelopment heighten its vulnerability. Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific significance, hosting one million Rohingya refugees, adds global stakes. Potential U.S. aid cuts, after USD 2.4 billion since 2017, could worsen Bangladesh’s economy. India has bolstered border security, but analysts urge reviving the Joint Rivers Commission and cultural exchanges. Bangladesh’s elections must curb Islamist influence to stabilise South Asia.
– with inputs from global bihari bureau
*Senior journalist
