Unnao Rape Case: Court Examines “Public Servant” in POCSO Act
Sengar Case Raises POCSO Debate Over Lawmaker Accountability
New Delhi: The legal odyssey of the Unnao rape case reached a critical inflection point in late 2025, reopening a foundational debate within the Indian judiciary on how child-protection laws apply when alleged crimes involve elected representatives exercising political power. At stake is not merely the fate of one former legislator, but the contours of accountability under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act when authority, influence, and vulnerability intersect.
That debate has now been firmly taken up by the Supreme Court, which on December 29, 2025, stayed the Delhi High Court’s order suspending the life sentence of former Uttar Pradesh MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar. The stay ensures that Sengar remains in custody while the apex court examines whether an elected legislator can be treated as a “public servant” for the purposes of aggravated offences under POCSO — a determination that could recalibrate how the law addresses crimes committed by powerful actors against children. The matter is listed for further hearing on January 20, 2026, after responses are filed.
A three-judge bench led by Chief Justice Surya Kant expressed serious reservations about the interpretative path adopted by the High Court. During the hearing, the bench observed, in substance, that accepting such a construction could produce anomalous outcomes — where lower-rung officials might fall within the aggravated framework, but elected Members of Parliament or Legislative Assemblies would stand outside it. The court also underscored the unusual factual posture of the case, noting that Sengar continues to serve a separate ten-year sentence for the custodial death of the survivor’s father, on which bail has not been granted. These features, the bench indicated, could not be divorced from the question of whether suspension of sentence was warranted.
The High Court’s order of December 23, 2025, did not re-examine the trial court’s findings on guilt. Instead, it focused narrowly on the statutory sustainability of the aggravated charge under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act, which applies when an offence is committed by a “public servant.” Observing that POCSO does not contain an independent definition of the term and instead draws upon Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court noted that the IPC does not expressly list Members of Legislative Assemblies as public servants, in contrast to the more expansive definition under the Prevention of Corruption Act. On that basis, the court held that the aggravated classification required reconsideration. Since Sengar had already served over seven years in custody — exceeding the minimum sentence prescribed for non-aggravated penetrative sexual assault — the High Court suspended the life sentence pending appeal.
That reasoning has now become the focal point of the prosecution’s challenge. The Central Bureau of Investigation and counsel for the survivor have argued that such a literal and compartmentalised reading risks hollowing out the protective architecture of the POCSO Act. Central to their submission before the Supreme Court is the argument that POCSO, as a special welfare statute, must be interpreted purposively rather than mechanically. The prosecution has relied on Section 42A, which accords the Act overriding effect over other laws, to contend that the meaning of “public servant” cannot be frozen within the confines of the IPC’s enumerated categories when the object of the legislation is to shield children from sexual exploitation by those wielding authority.
To reinforce this approach, the CBI has invoked both the Constitutional structure and precedent. It has cited decisions such as P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI) and L.K. Advani v. CBI, where legislators were treated as public servants for statutory purposes on the reasoning that they occupy public office, discharge public functions, and are remunerated from public funds. The prosecution has argued that it would be jurisprudentially incoherent to recognise lawmakers as public servants when allegations relate to corruption, but to deny that status when the charge involves grave sexual offences against children.
Flowing from this, the prosecution has articulated a “dominant position” rationale central to the aggravated framework under POCSO. According to the CBI, aggravation is not intended to hinge on rigid job titles but on whether the offender’s position of authority materially facilitated the offence or suppressed resistance, reporting, and access to justice. Political office, the prosecution submits, is inherently capable of creating such dominance. In Sengar’s case, it is argued that his status as a sitting MLA at the relevant time shaped both the circumstances of the alleged offence and the prolonged obstacles faced by the survivor and her family in seeking an institutional response.
The Supreme Court’s intervention has therefore attracted attention not only for its immediate consequence but for its potential precedential reach. Legal observers note that the court’s eventual ruling could shape how aggravated provisions under POCSO are applied in cases involving legislators and other powerful actors across jurisdictions. Pending matters, including the POCSO prosecution of former Karnataka Chief Minister B.S. Yediyurappa, illustrate this broader legal challenge.
In the Yediyurappa case, a complaint was filed in March 2024 alleging sexual assault of a 17-year-old girl at the former Chief Minister’s residence in Bengaluru. The Karnataka Criminal Investigation Department (CID) filed a detailed 750-page chargesheet in June 2024, naming multiple offences under POCSO and the Indian Penal Code, including destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice. While the High Court has refused to quash the case, it has allowed procedural protections such as anticipatory bail and limited personal appearances for Yediyurappa, reflecting ongoing judicial balancing between due process and child protection. The Supreme Court has also stayed trial proceedings pending appeal. Observers note that, like the Unnao case, Yediyurappa’s matter raises questions about whether high political office should factor into POCSO’s “aggravated” provisions and how procedural safeguards intersect with statutory intent. Together, the two cases underscore the judiciary’s task of reconciling protective legislation with entrenched social and political power asymmetries.
It is against this analytical and institutional backdrop that the long and troubled history of the Unnao case assumes renewed significance. The allegations date back to June 4, 2017, when a 17-year-old girl alleged that she was raped at Sengar’s residence in Unnao after being lured there with the promise of employment. For nearly a year thereafter, the survivor and her family reported that local police refused to register a First Information Report against the then-serving BJP legislator. The matter entered national focus in April 2018, when the survivor attempted self-immolation outside the residence of Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, protesting official inaction.
Soon after, her father died in judicial custody after being assaulted by Sengar’s brother and associates — an incident later classified by courts as culpable homicide. Although the CBI filed its first chargesheet in July 2018, the pressures surrounding the case did not abate. In July 2019, a truck with a blackened registration plate rammed into the vehicle carrying the survivor, her lawyer, and two aunts, killing both relatives and leaving the survivor critically injured. Citing the extraordinary circumstances and concerns over influence, the Supreme Court transferred all related cases to a special court in Delhi to ensure a fair trial.
That special court, in December 2019, convicted Sengar and sentenced him to life imprisonment for the rape of a minor, along with an additional ten years for the custodial death of the survivor’s father. Those findings on guilt remain undisturbed.
In the present appeals, Sengar’s defence has reiterated arguments relating to alleged inconsistencies in testimony, delays in naming the accused, age determination, and alleged investigative lapses — submissions that were raised at trial and rejected by the trial court. These contentions remain contested and have not found judicial acceptance at this stage.
As the case moves toward a substantive hearing, the central question before the Supreme Court is whether political office, by its nature, can constitute a dominant position sufficient to trigger POCSO’s most stringent provisions even in the absence of an explicit statutory label. The answer is likely to shape not only the outcome of the Unnao appeal but the future application of child-protection law to those who exercise power. For now, the court’s stay ensures that Sengar remains in custody, reflecting judicial caution against diluting accountability at the appellate stage and reaffirming the principle that protective legislation must be interpreted in a manner that serves the vulnerable rather than shields the influential.
Kicker: “The Supreme Court’s upcoming verdict will test whether power can ever exempt officeholders from the full force of child-protection law.”
– global bihari bureau
