Myanmar's Union Election Commission Chairman U Than Soe with Igor Borisov, Member of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on the day of polling on December 28, 2025. Photo source: The Union Election Commission, Myanmar.
By Nava Thakuria
War, Ballots and Diplomacy: Myanmar’s Contested Vote
Myanmar Votes in Fragments as Civil War Shadows Polls
The Myanmar military’s ongoing election process has been rejected by the United Nations, the National Unity Government in exile, several Western governments, and international human rights organisations, which argue that the polls are neither free nor inclusive. Critics point to the exclusion of major political parties, including the National League for Democracy, the detention of thousands of political leaders and activists, active armed conflict across large parts of the country, and restrictions on media and civil liberties. They maintain that elections conducted under military rule, without the participation of key stakeholders and amid widespread violence and displacement, cannot credibly reflect the will of the Myanmar people or serve as a basis for restoring democratic governance.
The military-ruled Myanmar, earlier known as Burma and historically referred to as Brahmadesh, conducted the first phase of its long-delayed general election on December 28, 2025, amid conditions resembling a civil war across the Southeast Asian nation. The polling exercise, marked by visibly low voter turnout, covered 102 of the country’s 330 townships, which function loosely as constituencies. Large swathes of the country were excluded as they remain outside the effective control of the military regime led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. At present, anti-military People’s Defence Forces, several ethnic armed organisations, and allied resistance groups control or contest nearly one-third of Myanmar’s territory. The remaining phases of the election are scheduled for January 11, 2026, covering about 100 townships, and January 25, 2026, in 63 townships, with the authorities indicating that results may be declared by the end of January.
Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist nation of more than 55 million people, has been under military rule since February 1, 2021, when the armed forces overthrew the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government in Naypyitaw. Since the coup, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to a cumulative prison term amounting to roughly 33 years under multiple convictions, while deposed President U Win Myint has received a 12-year sentence. Thousands of NLD leaders, party workers, civil servants, journalists, and ordinary civilians remain incarcerated. The exclusion of the NLD, which had won landslide victories in both the 2015 and 2020 general elections, has significantly eroded the credibility of the current electoral exercise. Pro-democracy activists and observers worldwide have described the process as a sham designed to legitimise continued military dominance rather than restore democratic governance.
The prolonged political turmoil has exacted a devastating humanitarian toll. Since the 2021 coup, violence linked to military crackdowns, armed resistance, and air strikes has led to the deaths of several thousand civilians, with estimates from monitoring groups and international agencies ranging from about 6,000 to over 7,500 fatalities. According to United Nations assessments, more than 3.6 million people have been internally displaced. Government forces have been accused of conducting indiscriminate operations, including aerial bombardments on civilian areas, hospitals, religious sites, and schools. Over 22,000 political prisoners remain in detention. Many prominent pro-democracy leaders and activists have fled to neighbouring countries such as Thailand, China, Bangladesh, and India to escape persecution. Despite these realities, Min Aung Hlaing and his associates are expected to project the election as evidence of political normalcy in a bid to secure domestic and international legitimacy for their seizure of power.
The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) introduced electronic voting machines for the first time in Myanmar, replacing paper ballots in polling planned across 274 townships, while the remaining areas were officially declared disturbed or unstable, particularly in Rakhine, Sagaing, and Shan regions. Voting commenced at 6 a.m. and concluded at 4 p.m. under heavy security in cities such as Naypyitaw, Yangon, and Mandalay, as well as in selected townships in the Bago and Ayeyarwady regions. Observers noted that most voters who did turn up were elderly citizens, many of whom appeared motivated by fear of reprisals from the armed forces, popularly known as the Tatmadaw. Younger voters, in contrast, largely boycotted the process. This stood in sharp contrast to the approximately 70 per cent voter turnout recorded in Myanmar’s last nationwide election in 2020.
Earlier, the UEC had cancelled the registration of several mainstream political parties on various grounds. More than 40 parties, including the NLD, chose not to re-register or were barred from doing so. Only six political parties, among them the junta-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party, the National Unity Party, the People’s Pioneer Party, the Myanmar Farmers Development Party, the Shan and Nationalities Democratic Party, and the People’s Party, were permitted to contest seats nationwide. Another 51 smaller parties were allowed to compete only in regional legislatures. In total, over 4,850 candidates remain in the race, a figure that critics argue masks the absence of genuine political competition.
International criticism of the election has remained sharp. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), a network of lawmakers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has urged regional leaders to reject the outcome of what it has described as a fraudulent process. Following discussions between an APHR delegation and the Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro, who is serving as ASEAN’s special envoy on Myanmar for 2026, the group expressed grave concern over escalating violence and worsening humanitarian conditions. APHR emphasised the need for a principled, united, and justice-driven regional approach to end the suffering of the Myanmar people and restore their democratic aspirations, warning that ASEAN’s credibility and regional stability remain at stake.
The election has also been rejected outright by the National Unity Government (NUG), an administration formed by ousted lawmakers and operating in exile, as well as by the United Nations, several Western governments, and international human rights organisations. These actors have consistently argued that the polls are neither free, fair, nor inclusive. NUG representatives maintain that the junta’s primary objective is to cloak its rule with a veneer of legitimacy rather than to hand power to an independent civilian administration. Political analysts similarly contend that the exercise is unlikely to alter the military’s grip on power and is instead aimed at easing international pressure and sanctions. Min Aung Hlaing, after casting his vote at a polling station, claimed that the election would be beneficial for the people, a statement that drew scepticism from both domestic and international observers.
Against this backdrop, a recent policy move by the United States has drawn attention and controversy. On November 24, 2025, with formal notice published shortly thereafter in the U.S. Federal Register, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for nationals of Burma, also known as Myanmar, with effect from 26 January 2026. Under U.S. law, such a decision follows a review of country conditions in consultation with relevant government agencies, including the Department of State. In the official notice, the Department of Homeland Security stated that conditions in Myanmar had improved sufficiently to allow for the safe return of its nationals, citing factors such as the end of the state of emergency, planned elections, ceasefire efforts, and improvements in local governance and public service delivery. The department further noted that allowing Burmese nationals to remain temporarily in the United States was deemed contrary to U.S. national interests.
The U.S. assessment, however, has been met with criticism from human rights groups and some international observers, who argue that ongoing conflict, widespread displacement, and political repression belie claims of stability or reconciliation. They contend that referencing the junta-organised election as evidence of progress risks lending indirect legitimacy to an electoral process widely condemned as unrepresentative.
Myanmar’s neighbours, including India, have expressed continuing concern over instability along the border regions and the steady influx of refugees. India, in particular, has strategic stakes in the under-construction Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which links its northeastern states to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. Regional governments remain wary that prolonged instability could further disrupt cross-border trade, security, and humanitarian conditions.
Looking ahead, Min Aung Hlaing is widely expected to assume the presidency under arrangements shaped by the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, which reserves 25 per cent of parliamentary seats and key ministries for serving military officers. Under this framework, elected lawmakers are likely to have limited influence, effectively functioning as passive participants while the armed forces retain decisive control over political and security matters. As Myanmar proceeds with its fragmented and contested electoral process, many observers warn that without inclusive dialogue, the release of political prisoners, and a genuine cessation of violence, the exercise will do little to resolve the country’s deepening crisis or restore democratic rule.
*Senior journalist
